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Slovenia put the transition to knowledge economy/society in
the centre of its development strategy that is driven by global
economic trends and also inspired by the EU Lisbon Strategy.
The establishment of a well-functioning national innovation
system (NIS) is perceived as the main instrument of the
Slovenian transition to knowledge society. The article attempts
to analyse some of the elements of NIS and their recent
developments to illustrate the main gaps and achievements.
The implementation of the major strategic documents driving
towards knowledge society in the last five years shows a mixed
picture: in some areas the objectives and targets have been
achieved, while in others the gaps remain. The article points to
the issue of governance capability, which is often forgotten, but
is an essential element of the transition. Without improved
governance capability the country cannot establish an efficient
NIS and consequently move to a knowledge society. This
suggests that turning a vision to reality requires significant
effort in improving the governance capability.
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INTRODUCTION
Around the turn of the century a new policy context emerged,
based on the conviction that the key to facing global challen-
ges consisted of making the transition to a knowledge-based e-
conomy through more and better investment in the knowledge967
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triangle of research, education and innovation. Society held
high expectations for research as more and better research
and development (R&D) appeared capable of improving eco-
nomic performance, promoting employment, improving pu-
blic health, tackling demographic, cohesion and environmen-
tal challenges (Felt and Wynne, 2007). A wide-spread belief is
that the sustained economic and social development today
depends significantly on the continuous creation and appli-
cation of knowledge. This new emphasis on knowledge is at
least in part the result of new growth theories (Romer, 1990;
Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and institutional and evolu-
tionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The first stress
the specific character of knowledge and education as intangi-
ble productive factors while the latter emphasises the role of
innovation as the applied/commercialised knowledge which
has boosted the concept of the national innovation system (Nel-
son, 1993; Lundvall, 1992).
Development strategies, associated with the term know-
ledge economy/society, are based on observation that funda-
mental changes are taking place at the level of the economy
which are having wide-ranging impacts throughout society and
could result in major changes to how people live and work
(KEI, 2007). Knowledge includes technical know-how, but
also cultural, social and managerial knowledge. This transfor-
mation of the structures of the modern economy by know-
ledge as a productive force constitutes the basis and justifica-
tion for designating advanced modern society as a "know-
ledge society". According to Stehr (2003) "Advanced society may
be described as a knowledge society because of the penetra-
tion of all its spheres by scientific and technical knowledge".
By provision of higher living standards, the use of know-
ledge supports the development of society as a whole and
helps to fulfil social needs. The broader implications of socio-
-cultural and political transition to a knowledge society and
discussion on possible positive and negative developments go
beyond the scope of this paper. According to Stehr's termi-
nology, we restrict our discussion to science (not knowledge)
policy which is conducted mainly by the national governments
and addresses the creation and application of knowledge as a
material precondition for development of knowledge society.
This course of thinking suggests that a country first needs to
establish sufficient capacity for knowledge generation if it wi-
shes to achieve successful transformation towards knowledge
society. The science policy develops, thus, many strategies and
instruments (tax policies, supporting programmes, subsidi-








This paper attempts to assess the transition process to-
wards knowledge society in Slovenia, looking at science and
innovation policy, first at various strategy papers and instru-
ments and then at their implementation. The final aims is to
assess the success in the implementation of various strategies
in order to show the good practices as well as the gaps at the
level of indicators, at the level of measures and at the level of
policy implementation. The major focus is on the national in-
novation system, which is assumed to be one of the key pil-
lars of productive use of knowledge for successful transition.
SLOVENIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN
POLICIES TOWARDS KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
While there are certain differences in the scientific literature
as to the key elements of knowledge economy/society as well
as the drivers to the transition of societies,1 a number of im-
portant areas are commonly identified and have been addres-
sed by policy makers at various levels – from the World Bank,
OECD, EU, to the national states.
Slovenia as an EU member state follows the target of the
Lisbon strategy adopted in 2000 which sets the goal of posi-
tioning the EU as the world's most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy by 2010. Investments in ICT and
creation of information society, strengthening research and
innovation as well as improvement in higher education and
human capital made the three pillars of the EU strategy to-
ward the knowledge society.
By 2004, only four years after the launch of the Lisbon a-
genda, the assessment of achieved goals (so-called Kok Re-
port: EU, 2004), revealed that in many areas the gap between
the planned and implemented activities is significant. There-
fore, the EU re-launched the Lisbon strategy in 2005 putting
the stress this time on only a few most critical problems – eco-
nomic growth and new jobs.2 During the next three years, the
implementation of the Lisbon strategy appeared to have gained
in momentum (EC, 2007). However, the EU's economic growth
recorded in 2007 (1.8% since 2005) has been seriously deterio-
rated by the economic and financial crisis in 2009. In fact, in-
dependent evaluations found that the gap between the best
and the worst performing countries is wider in 2010 than it
was in 2000 (Tilford and Whyte, 2010). The shares of EU in glo-
bal R&D in the three main categories – the number of re-
searchers, the investment level and the patent applications –
have declined (Bučar and Udovič, 2010). In March 2008, the
European Council opened a discourse on the future of the Lis-
bon Process post-2010 and on ways towards a European Glo-







Commission launched the successor of the Lisbon Strategy, a
new initiative – "Europe 2020",3 which stresses the need for
"smart, sustainable and inclusive growth". According to the
"Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines", each member state is
obliged to set out the National Reform Programme (NRP). NRP
should set up the national agenda for reforms of the R&D
and innovation systems with special stress on some new is-
sues like smart specialisation, reinforcing cooperation between
universities and business, sufficient supply of science, maths
and engineering, and so on.
The European "forth and back" towards knowledge soci-
ety illustrates the complexity and difficulties of building a
meaningful strategy and efficient policy for achieving growth
based on knowledge. We are in agreement with Mrak (2010)
that "creating more favourable framework conditions for pri-
vate R&D investment, establishing more appropriate gover-
nance structures and the growth of research intensive sectors
therefore remain among the key EU objectives in building a
knowledge-based economy."
This leads us to our hypothesis that the transition to the
knowledge-based economy/society is not so much a techno-
logical issue, but above all, a development issue with strong
economic, social and cultural dimensions. The changes re-
quire a set of much wider socio-economic measures and a co-
ordinated activity of different actors (Bučar and Stare, 2006).
They are more difficult to achieve and their implementation
is more time-consuming, especially since they require a suffi-
cient level of governance capability. This has often proved to
be the key bottleneck in the transition process from tradition-
al industrial society to knowledge society and can be demon-
strated at the level of EU or at the level of individual coun-
tries. The insufficient governance capability and coordination
of policies in the implementation of ERA as a cornerstone of
EU strategy in the field of R&D for transition to knowledge
society at EU level was analysed by the Lisbon Expert Group
(EC, 2009, 7) and they found that "governance weakness is
becoming a key bottleneck preventing the advancement in
knowledge policies in Europe".
KEY STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY DOCUMENTS
Slovenia has declared its vision of transforming itself into know-
ledge society in several of its strategic documents, from Slove-
nian Development Strategy (SDS-2006-2013; IMAD, 2005), theNa-
tional Research and Development Programme (NRDP-2005-2010),
the National Reform Programme for Achieving the Lisbon Strategy
Goals 2005–2010 (Republic of Slovenia, 2005) with 2008 revi-
sion (NRP), the National Development Plan (2007-2013) and the







cuments were prepared nearly simultaneously, they all share
a common vision: Slovenia will strive towards transition to know-
ledge society and focus on all necessary policies to achieve
this dynamic transformation. As a member of the EU, Slove-
nia accepted all the targets set forth in the Lisbon strategy,
and made their implementation the backbone of the national
strategy papers. One of the important objectives of all the
documents was the development of a well-functioning NIS,
enabling the transformation to knowledge society.
Specifically for the R&D and innovation area, the
National Research and Development Programme (NRDP,
2006) was prepared in 2005. Key objectives included:
• Increasing of public R&D investment to 1% of GDP by 2010;
• Shifting balance of public research funds from basic non-tar-
geted research in favour of targeted (and applied) research;
• Introduction of support measures to stimulate growth of
investment of business sector in R&D to help achieve a
2% of GDP target;
• Growth of number of researchers with PhDs in the busi-
ness sector;
• Higher rate of establishment of new high-tech firms,
including promotion of spin-offs from universities;
• Continuous participation in the international research,
especially in ERA;
• Support to the growth of patents, as an indicator of busi-
ness relevance of research;
• Growth of high-tech exports and growth of value-added
in Slovenian economy.
To be able to draw on the EU Structural funds, Slovenia
had to prepare the National Development Programme 2007–
20134 in 2006. Again, R&D and innovation were placed high-
ly among the priorities and their key role in achieving the de-
velopment objectives was clearly spelled out. The activities
are to be funded through the projects within first priority of
the Operational Programme of European Regional Develop-
ment Fund "Competitiveness of enterprises and research ex-
cellence."5 (NSRF, 2007). The support to joint research and de-
velopment projects, to the investment in modernisation of in-
termediary organisations and other institutions in R&D and
for R&D in business enterprises would enable development
of a coherent and efficient NIS and thus provide the basis for
knowledge economy/society.
As observed in the beginning, the existing policy docu-
ments address the challenges of Slovenian R&D and innova-
tion system well and set forth clear objectives. In fact, they may







cuments are only the broad framework; it is the implemen-
tation which reflects the efficacy of innovation policy.
THE CURRENT STATE OF NIS IN SLOVENIA
A well-functioning NIS in fact requires a strong research &
development (R&D) system, producing high-quality relevant
knowledge, sufficient quality of human resources and inno-
vative entrepreneurs (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). The effi-
ciency of NIS depends on the interactions among these dif-
ferent constituting elements, on the quality of each one of
them and very much so on the overall socio-political climate.
An efficient NIS is, in our opinion, the central element of know-
ledge society. The country's capability to successfully imple-
ment the transition to knowledge society therefore depends
on the strength of its NIS.
The Slovenian innovation system has over the years
evolved through a complex relationship of a relatively influ-
ential public R&D sector, increasing presence of business as
the key investor in R &D and innovation and a search for op-
timal governance of innovation policy. The country is making
slow, but continuous progress in its innovation performance
and has, according to the European Innovation Scoreboard
joined the countries labelled as innovation followers (EC, 2010).
The question is how supportive it is in its current framework
for the transition to the knowledge society.
The current state of affairs in building a coherent and
well-functioning NIS in Slovenia is a good illustration of the
achievements of the country in its transition to knowledge
economy.
Basic R&D and innovation indicators
In terms of R&D input indicators (number of researchers, a-
mount of public R&D investment, level of business R&D invest-
ment), Slovenia scores relatively well in comparison to the EU
average. More problematic remains the output side, particu-
larly if measured by number of innovative firms, high tech
export or number of patents (EC, 2010). If, according to Euro-
pean Innovation Scoreboard, Slovenia achieved a 6% rate of
growth in enablers,6 the progress on the output side shows
only 0.5% growth during the observed period.7 Similarly,
Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Slovenia 21st among 82
countries as to the direct inputs in innovation index (R&D by pu-
blic and industry sector, educational attainment, IT develop-
ment), but assesses the innovation environment (political envi-
ronment, market opportunities, tax system, policy towards en-
trepreneurship and competition, trade, policy towards FDI, fi-
nance, etc.) as low as 45th (EIU, 2009, 12). A possible interpre-972
tation of these data is that while innovation policy measures
can have relatively quick impact on the input side (increased
R&D investment by business sector, for example), the transla-
tion of the inputs into noticeable change on the output side,
especially in altering the economic structure (employment in
high tech manufacturing & services; export share of high tech),
requires a significantly longer time frame.
Source: Eurostat (2011): http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/print.do?print=true (accessed
on Oct 31, 2011).
The level of research and development (R&D) investment
in Slovenia in recent years has been around 1.5% of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) for several years now, with small os-
cillations, but under the EU-27 average. In the year 2009 the
percentage was 1.86% of GDP or 656.9 million EUR for R&D
(SORS, 2011a), up from 1.66% in 2008. The amount spent for
R&D in the business sector was €380.9m, representing a share
of 58%, for the first time in several years showing a slight de-
crease, which is attributed to the financial/economic crisis. The
share of government funding of 36% (€234.2m) of total R&D
expenses reflects an increase over previous years, reflecting
the measures undertaken by the government in an attempt to
reduce the negative effects of the crisis.
While the figures are relatively impressive if compared
with other transition countries,8 they remain below the target
of 3% of GDP by 2010, as planned in strategic documents: in
fact, their achievement had been postponed to 2013 (Republic
of Slovenia, 2008). Except for 2009, when the government com-




as per cent of GDP in
comparison with
selected countries
expenditures were below the planned rate of increase. In view
of the financial and economic crisis, the 2009 level was not main-
tained in the next years: both the 2010 and 2011 preliminary




Business Government education non-profit GERD
Sources of funds (million €) (million €) (million €) (million €) (million €)
Total 424.4 136.36 95.7 0.463 656.9
Business enterprises 355.9 15.9 8.8 0.289 380.9
Government 49.97 109.71 74.44 0.130 234.25
Higher education - - 1.9 - 1.9
Private non-profit organisations - 0.026 0.171 0.006 0.203
Funds from abroad 18.6 10.7 10.4 0.037 39.7
Source: SORS (2011a)
What was achieved in line with the strategy papers is the
ratio 2:1 between the business and public sector R&D expen-
ditures. Also, the ratio of government R&D budget appropri-
ations has changed from 2005, when 75% of total resources
available for R&D went for science and only 14% for technolo-
gy development, to 60% for science and 30% for technology,
gradually moving to the targets set in strategic documents.
This move was due to several new measures, where co-finan-
cing was secured through European cohesion and structural
policy funds.
Increased resources resulted in the growth of employ-
ment in R&D, with business sector surpassing the public and
higher education in overall employment in R&D sector, but
not yet in terms of number of researchers. In 2008, the total num-
ber of R&D personnel in FTE in the business sector was 6205,
of which 3058 were researchers. The government sector and
HEI combined employed 5366 personnel (FTE), but 3951 of
these were researchers (SORS, 2009).
As for the educational attainment of R&D personnel, the
number of employees with PhD, while on the increase,10 is
still very low in business R&D – only 10% of all researchers or
411 in comparison with 1213 in public R&D institutions and
2452 in HEI.
The increased business investment in R&D is at least in
part the result of a special tax subsidy, which is available since
2006 to the enterprises for R&D investment. The enterprises
can reduce their taxable income for corporate tax by 40% of
their investment in R&D in general and by an additional 20%
if the investment is made in the regions where the development
gap11 is more than 15%. The tax subsidy was set at 20-40% ini-974
 TABLE 1
Funding and perfor-
ming sector in R&D
(2009), final data
tially, but further increased to the current level in 2010 (Of-
ficial Gazette 43, 2010). The key reason for the increase of sub-
sidy was to prevent a decline in business R&D investment due
to the economic crisis.
Source: SORS, various years
Most recent data on innovation activity (Community In-
novation Survey 2006–2008) is at first glance very positive for
Slovenia, since the share of innovation-active firms has in-
creased from 35.1% during the period 2004–2006 to over 50%
(SORS, 2010b), which would be fully in line with the targets
set in strategic documents. Yet the newest survey has applied
revised international methodology, where not only techno-
logical innovation is included but also non-technological (or-
ganisational or marketing) innovation is accounted for. Most
of the reporting companies have introduced both, technolo-
gical and non-technological innovation (25.2%), yet if we
count these firms together with the ones who only introduced
technological innovation (9.1%), the total figure is below the
35.1% of innovation-active firms in 2004–2006. In view of the
number of measures, focused on promotion of innovation ac-
tivity, this result is rather disappointing. Still, the new me-
thodology draws attention to the impact of non-technological
innovation, which traditionally has been disregarded in tran-
sition economies (Stare and Bučar, 2009).
The degree of innovation cooperation places Slovenian en-
terprises on the fourth place in EU. According to CIS 2002–
2004 and 2004–2006, the cooperation of innovation active en-
terprises is on the increase in all categories. The most dynamic
and closest is the cooperation with the suppliers on one hand
and the customers on the other. This could be expected in the
production value-chain. The tendency to cooperate in inno-









of employment in FTE
prises, which is difficult to explain, since one would assume
that it is SMEs who have limited individual capacity to inno-
vate and therefore enter into cooperation with other partners.
While 80% of innovation-active large enterprises have co-ope-
rated with other enterprises or institutions, only half as many
(39.6%) of small enterprises did. Particularly low is the coop-
eration of SMEs with government or public research institutes:
only 9.1% of respondents have cooperated with them. In the
case of higher education sector, the cooperation was reported
by 13.6% of SMEs.12 Yet, our research, based on case studies,
has shown that several successful companies, regardless of
their size, have established links with public research either at
universities or research institutes and formed permanent
teams of researchers from both sides. According to their state-
ments, it took some time to find a common language and to
develop fruitful cooperation, but in the end, the result is ben-
eficial to both sides (Bučar and Rojec, 2009).
Support institutions
Over the years, Slovenia has developed a rather complex scheme
of institutions for R&D and innovation policy implementa-
tion, set up with the ambition to provide as complete innova-
tion system as possible. The support institutions can be grouped
according to their main tasks in the following categories:
a) Government executing/funding agencies: Slovenian Re-
search Agency, Slovenian Technology Agency, Public Agen-
cy for Entrepreneurship and Foreign Investment, Slove-
nian Enterprise Fund.
b) 'Bridging' and support institutions like technology cen-
tres, technology platforms, centres of excellence, clusters,
technology parks, business and university incubators, te-
chnology transfer offices, VEM-points,13 regional deve-
lopment agencies, etc.
c) Financial intermediaries: venture capital funds, business
angels association, etc.
The relatively extensive support network is often criti-
cised for its low effectiveness due to insufficient coordination
and specialisation, with no clear demarcation of the tasks. The
challenge of coordinated approach to designing the most effi-
cient network, combining the roles of various institutions in a
coherent and transparent support system remains a difficult
but urgent task for the policy makers, since the intermediate
institutions are an important element of the knowledge-sup-
portive NIS. Their task of disseminating knowledge through







they are not well co-ordinated and provide suboptimal sup-
port, they are a barrier instead of promoter of the transition.
Institutional setting and policy measures
The institutional framework of innovation policy with its re-
latively frequent changes since Slovenia's independence reflects
the search for the most efficient division of tasks between dif-
ferent ministries. Each of the past elections had brought for-
ward new ideas on how to best organise the government to
be more supportive to science, technology and innovation.
Since 2008, the innovation policy is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, the
Ministry of Economy and to some extent also the two Go-
vernment Offices: the Office for Development and European
Affairs and the Office for Local Self-Government and Regio-
nal Development. All of these bodies also have responsibili-
ties in the implementation of the strategic policy documents,
related to the Lisbon strategy and transition to knowledge so-
ciety. This suggests strong integration of innovation in the
transition process.
In the innovation system so far the support to R&D, espe-
cially public R&D, has been seen as the most important objec-
tive. However, following the line of the Lisbon strategy and
especially due to the significant amount of additional re-
sources coming from the EU Structural funds, the business re-
lated R&D measures have gained in their importance since
2008. Several new measures were introduced: from strategic
research and investment projects (RIPs) to centres of excel-
lence and most recently, centres of competence. The values of
those programmes are significant for Slovenian R&D. They
range from 1 million EUR (RIPs) to nearly 10 million EUR (cen-
tres of excellence) and provide important new R&D capacity.
What will the impact of these measures be on the generation
of new knowledge and the effectiveness of NIS is as yet too
early to speculate.
In view of the increased available resources, a close moni-
toring of the absorption capacity of the business sector is re-
quired. Also the ability of public R&D to deliver effectively
the support under existing policy measures should be regu-
larly assessed. A positive sign is that the evaluation and re-
porting practice has significantly improved over the recent
years, since most of the agencies or the ministries, which have
to report on the use of the European funds have increased
their attention to evaluation and several of the new measures
have stipulated from the start the regular evaluation intervals
(for example, the centres of excellence have to be evaluated
annually).977
Human resources for NIS/knowledge society
The issue of sufficiently educated and trained human re-
sources is one of the central topics for the future development
of Slovenian NIS and consequently of knowledge society. Not
only is it important from the viewpoint of having an ade-
quate supply of new researchers, but equally so in raising the
educational attainment of the entrepreneurs in SMEs and the
overall educational level of citizens. Slovenia has in 2010/2011
surpassed its target of enrolling more than half of the respec-
tive generation in tertiary education (IMAD, 2011). The num-
ber of students enrolled in tertiary education relative to the
number of the population aged 20–26 increased from 29.9%
in 2000 to 41% in 2008/2009. As noted by IMAD (2010), in the
academic year 2008/2009, participation of the generation at en-
rolment age in tertiary education (53.1%) was close to the Slo-
venian Development Strategy target (55%). Even though the
enrolment in Science & Technology programmes has been pro-
moted heavily, Social sciences and humanities still remain the
most popular choice and attract as many as 43% of all en-
rolled. This can be seen also in the percentage of SSH gradu-
ates, representing a share of 44% of all graduates and Arts pro-
grammes, most of them from law and business studies (SORS,
2011b).
The increase in the enrolment was not followed by an a-
dequate increase in the number of teaching staff. Slovenia still
lags considerably behind most European countries. The ratio
in Slovenia is also worsened by the fact that young people not
only enrol in tertiary education to acquire education but also
to take advantage of the benefits of being a student.14 This is
further reflected in low efficiency of studies. The average du-
ration of studies of full-time university graduates is among
the highest in Europe. In 2008, the average duration was 6.7
years (2007: 6.8 years).15 The low efficiency of studies is also
seen by comparing data on the number of students in tertiary
education per 1.000 population aged 20–29, where Slovenia is
well above the EU average,16 with data on the number of gra-
duates of tertiary education per 1.000 population aged 20–29,
where Slovenia lags behind the EU average.17
KEY INDICATORS FOR THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY/SOCIETY
An assessment of what was achieved during the five years of
the implementation of strategic documents revealed mixed
results. In some indicators, Slovenia is meeting the targets; in
some the gaps are just as big as they were at the beginning of
the envisaged transition to knowledge society. For a more objec-
tive picture, it is relevant to see, how the country compares
with others.978
Two different systems of comparison are considered: one
is the Knowledge Economy Index developed by the World Bank.
The KAM18 consists of 109 structural and qualitative variables
for 146 countries to measure their performance on the 4 Know-
ledge Economy (KE) pillars: Economic Incentive and Institu-
tional Regime, Education, Innovation, and Information and
Communications Technologies. According to the latest avail-
able data (2009), Slovenia is ranked as the 25th country in the
world.
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page2.asp (Oct. 28, 2011)
The graph above shows the position of Slovenia accord-
ing to the main indicators of KEI in comparison to all coun-
tries included in the database. What is informative is the pro-
gress achieved from 1995 in overall KEI as well as in indivi-
dual groups of indicators. In overall KEI, practically no pro-
gress has been made (+0.03). In terms of individual groups,
catching up can be noticed in the area of economic incentives
and institutional regime (+0.89), slight progress in innovation
(+0.33) and education (+0.38) and a substantial fall-back in
ICT area (-1.74).
Extensive research on indicators was carried out also wi-
thin EU FP6 project on Knowledge Economy Indicators.19 The
project's aim was to develop and improve indicators for the










sues and the use of composite indicators. The project has cov-
ered indicators from 25 European countries (the EU-25) and
two non-European countries (the US and Japan). A total of
115 individual indicators have been selected to measure the
sub-dimensions of the knowledge-based economy (KBE) and
grouped under the seven main dimensions:20
• production and diffusion of ICT;
• human resources, skills and creativity;
• knowledge production and diffusion;
• innovation, entrepreneurship, creative production;
• economic outputs;
• social performance and
• internationalisation.
The composite Knowledge Economy Index was then cal-
culated as well as ranking according to each of the seven main
groups and all of the 115 indicators produced (KEI, 2008, WP 8).
Knowledge Economy Index
Rank
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Sweden 54 46
Denmark 55 30 14
Luxembourg 36 4 14 25 4 7 7 4
Finland 18 23 29 9 11 11
USA 11 32 2 4 39 9 4
Japan 4 7 18 32 36 4
UK 2 5 16 38 39
Netherlands 86 4 4 7
Ireland 4 61 14 4 9 9
Austria 18 50 18 7 7
Belgium 11 4 11 57 16 2
France 4 14 18 11 54
EU15 4 57 39
EU25 4 4 14 32 39 7
Germany 7 79 4 7 4
Slovenia 7 41 38 14
Estonia 4 36 25 21 11 4
Malta 7 13 9 21 23 27
Cyprus 36 7 4 23 23 7
Spain 4 4 32 25 29 7
Czech. Rep. 4 7 30 39 5 7 7
Latvia 20 36 11 21 7 5
Italy 29 18 9 29 9 7
Greece 4 4 4 29 18 21 7 14
Lithuania 4 41 13 32 11
Hungary 2 13 13 57 2 14
Portugal 4 4 7 11 61 14
Slovakia 4 7 18 71
Poland 100
Legend: frequency lower 15%, frequency between 15 and 30%, frequency between 30 and 50%, frequency greater than 50%.
Source: http://www.uni-trier.de/fileadmin/fb4/projekte/SurveyStatisticsNet/KEI-WP5-D5. 8etal. pdf, p. 11.
Slovenia found itself in 16-17th place with most of the
indicators. The values for 7 indicators would put the country










country's position is lower than this ranking. Interestingly, when
the authors calculated the ranking according to individual
dimension, Slovenia scored best in social performance (11th
place) and worst in internationalisation (20-21st place). In terms
of indicators, related to NIS, the ranking was rather stable: a-
round 14 to 19th place, close to the EU25 average, which would
be a corresponding score for Slovenia in the already men-
tioned European Innovation Scoreboard.
Taking on board warnings of methodology problems with
composite indicators and missing data, we can conclude that
our assessment is confirmed by these rankings as well: Slo-
venia's performance is mixed-some indicators show progress,
while others need to be substantially improved if the vision of
knowledge society is to become a reality. What seems to stand
out as a particular problem is not the setting of the strategy or
design of the appropriate measures of innovation policy per
se, but the implementation of the broader socio-economic po-
licies, related to effective functioning of the national innova-
tion system. If the national innovation system is to support
the transition to the knowledge economy/society, it needs to
be well integrated in the overall development policy-setting
with strong horizontal and vertical linkages. This goes much
beyond "simple" design of R&D and innovation policy, but
touches upon the broader issue of governance capability.
THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNANCE
CAPABILITY FOR KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
Governance comprises "all those activities of social, political,
and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful ef-
forts to guide, steer, control or manage sectors or facets of so-
cieties" (Kooiman, 2003). Governance is an interactive process
involving various forms of partnerships, collaboration, com-
petition and negotiation. It implicitly addresses the issue of
accountability, lack of transparency and representation, all of
which may create weaknesses (OECD, 2005, 24). European
Commission's White Paper on Governance (EC, 2001) sets out
five principles that underpin good governance. They are: open-
ness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.
These are required for the sound management of public re-
sources and essential in creating environment conducive to
business, as well as a productive partnership between public
and private sectors.
Innovation governance incorporates a broad set of mech-
anisms, instruments and institutions in the field of R&D, edu-
cation, and entrepreneurship. It focuses on the interplay be-
tween the various actors that together determine the priori-
ties, strategies, activities and outcomes in innovation (Boek-







ordination and interaction across different organisations affec-
ting innovation capabilities: we talk of horizontal and vertical
coherence of innovation policy. Horizontality of innovation
policy in practice means that all the measures introduced in
other policy areas (for example in fiscal policy or in educational
policies) are checked for their impact on innovation (EC, 2003).
On the other hand, the vertical coherence relates to coordi-
nation of policies among different levels of actors (national,
regional) in the field of innovation.
The governance capability in the area of innovation pol-
icy is crucial for success in further design and implementation
of publicly funded measures and their impact on the econo-
my. The effectiveness of influencing the innovation capabili-
ties and behaviour of enterprises relies on the "governance" of
R&D and innovation policies (EC, 2003).
In the case of Slovenian development of NIS, insufficient-
ly developed governance capability can be detected in the in-
troduction of overlapping policy measures, insufficient trans-
parency of support institutions or in poorly adjusted mecha-
nisms, transferred from other countries (EU, 2009). In several
cases, there is significant discrepancy between the policy pa-
pers to the actual practice: while in all of the cited strategic pa-
pers innovation is highly praised, the public budget alloca-
tion did not follow this praise. This results in the so called
"implementation deficit", where several well-designed inno-
vation support measures never become operational or were
put in place with insufficient resources21 (Bučar, 2009).
Building the innovation capacity in terms of sufficient
number of enterprises engaged in innovation activity as well
as governance capability requires a long-term effort, which
needs to move beyond institutional build-up. The setting up
of the institutions and policy measures are the first steps only,
which need to be followed by the creation of efficient policy
mix, focused on the major gaps in innovation capacity. Fre-
quent changes in the institutional set-up, in the responsibili-
ties and roles of different public agents as well as in changing
measures, have undermined the governance capability in in-
novation policy and created a fragmented innovation sup-
port system, which not only is difficult to manage, but is also
unfriendly towards those it should be benefiting.
Attainment of governance capacity is a long-term pro-
cess, and the complexities should not be underestimated.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In the long run, a small economy such as the Slovenian, with
ambitions to build a knowledge society, can do this only with
an efficient national innovation system. Slovenia will there-
fore need to change its mode of functioning and "move from







not only within the EU but also within the global division of
labour. Unless this change happens, the country faces the dan-
ger of a laggard and the living standard of our citizens would
reflect this. In this process of catching up, further promotion
of human resources build-up and a modern R&D sector as
well as of widespread innovation activity in private and pub-
lic sectors could be used as strategic "tools", if integrated into
the overall national development strategy.
The analysis of countries that were successful in the past
in catching-up with more developed countries by leap-frog-
ging certain development stages shows that this was never ac-
hieved without a conscious action of the government.22 The
transformation of R&D and educational systems towards in-
novation does not occur by spontaneous activity of the free
market or even by increased investment in R&D. Contrary to
this, the very nature of innovation as an endogenous process
calls for the type of economic growth which is embedded in
the overall social, cultural and institutional framework of a
country (Švarc, 2006, 337). A pro-active role of the government
as well as of broader society is therefore needed, or in the words
of Abramovitz (1986) sufficient "social capability", which in
turn determines the ability for technological and structural
transformation of a country and thus opens up the possibili-
ty for catching up and a transition to knowledge-based econ-
omy/society.
For a vision to become a reality, good strategy is an im-
portant starting point, but the governance capability to en-
gage all stakeholders in a coordinated manner in the imple-
mentation process is essential. The issue of governance capa-
bility should not be underestimated in these processes. Both,
the EU implementation of the Lisbon process as well as Slo-
venian transition to knowledge society as conceptualised in
the strategic documents show that it is the governance capa-
bility which is detrimental to the success. Partial policies, no mat-
ter how well designed, cannot bring about the overall change.
This should be observed by other transition societies as well: to
decide on a strategy is only the first and probably the least dif-
ficult step towards the knowledge society, the ability to imple-
ment this structural change is where the difficult challenges lie.
NOTES
1 A good overview of different issues related to knowledge society/
economy is provided in the paper "The puzzle of knowledge society"
by European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Wor-
king Conditions (Eurofound, 2004).
2 On this basis the EC published the Integrated Guidelines for Growth
and Jobs 2005-2008; available at http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/
pdf/integrated_guidelines_en.pdf.







4 Rep. of Slovenia (2007) Office of Government for Local Self Govern-
ment and Regional Policy. See more at: http://www.svlr.gov.si/si/
delovna_podrocja/drzavni_razvojni_program.
5 Operativni program krepitve regionalnih razvojnih potencialov 2007–2013.
(Operational Programme for strengthening regional development potentials
2007–2013.) Available at: http://www.svlr.gov.si/fileadmin/svlsrp.gov.si/
pageuploads/KOHEZIJA/OP_RR_USKLA-JENO_08_06_07_poslano.pdf.
6 EIS groups indicators in three segments: enablers (human resour-
ces and public R&D investment), firm activities (business sector in-
vestment in R&D& innovation cooperation, patents and technology
balance of payment) and outputs (number of new products on the
market, high tech export and employment, etc.).
7 One also needs to take into consideration the fact that for several
output indicators no (recent) data is available.
8 Udovič and Bučar found (2008, 36, 38) that between 1995 and 2005
Slovenia led among NMS in GERD (which amounted to nearly 300%
of GERD in Slovakia or Poland) and in BERD, which was already in
2004, for example, four times bigger than Slovak.
9 The first revision of the budget (April 2009) added new resources
for R&D and innovation, so the total allocation was planned at 370
million €. Yet due to the deepening of the economic crisis, the second
revision of the budget for 2009 took place in July 2009, and the
amount for R&D and innovation was revised downward to 335 mil-
lion €. This figure still represented an increased amount available for
technological restructuring of the business sector (see details in EU,
2010).
10 From 2006 the number has increased by 37% (SORS, various years).
11 Development gap is calculated as the difference between the ave-
rage per capita income in Slovenia and the income achieved in par-
ticular region.
12 On the other hand, large firms cite 38.8% of cooperation with pub-
lic research institutes and as much as 53.8% of cooperation with HEI.
13 VEM–points (vse na enem mestu – all in one place) were estab-
lished to provide a single entry point for new enterprises, where
complete information required for setting up business is provided.
14 Additional explanation for the long time required to graduate is
the benefits enjoyed by the legal status of students (e.g. students can
work with no income tax while employers do not need to pay social
and health security compulsory contributions. In addition, such em-
ployment provides for high level of flexibility in hiring, since this is
typically a temporary engagement. The government proposed a new
law on regulating this type of employment in spring 2010, which
resulted in loud opposition by the student organisations.
15 Data from EUROSTUDENT III (2005–2008), available for 2006 or
2007.
16 In 2007, the ratio in Slovenia was 40.1, the EU average was 28.6
(IMAD, 2010).
17 In Slovenia, the number of graduates in tertiary education per










19 C1S8-CT-2004-502529 KEI; http://www.uni-trier.de/index.php?
id=26661.
20 Details on the methodology and the approach to construction of
the Index can be found at http://www.uni-trier.de/fileadmin/fb4/
projekte/SurveyStatisticsNet/KEI-WP5-D5.8etal.pdf.
21 One such case is the creation of the Slovenian Innovation Agency,
which was proposed by a PHARE project in 1999, accepted by the
government, but never implemented. A similar story was with the
university incubators: as suggested by the PHARE 2003 study, the
support measure for university incubators was introduced in 2004.
Yet after the initial enthusiasm, the incubators ran into serious trou-
ble because the administrative procedure for the preparation of the
public call under the PHARE programme delayed the payment of
funds and nearly caused the bankruptcy of the incubators (EU,
2006).
22 Freeman (1989) points out the complexity of such undertakings:
The success of any country to catch-up within the next decades
depends crucially on their ability for institutional innovation, infra-
structure, investment in education, S&T and last, but not least, on
the international economic system.
REFERENCES
Abramovitz, M. (1986), Catching Up, Forging Ahead and Falling
Behind. Journal of Economic History, 46 (2): 385-406. doi:10.1017/S00
22050700046209
Boekholt, P. (2004), Ensuring Policy Coherence by Improving the
Governance of Innovation Policy, Trend Chart Policy Workshop Back-
ground Paper, Brussels: EC, http://trendchart.cordis.lu/reports/documents/
WKS1_backgroundpaper.pdf.
Bučar, M. and Udovič, B. (2010), Slovenia and the Lisbon Strategy: A
Road to Knowledge Economy? In: P. Drulák and Z. Šabič (Eds.), The
Czech and Slovenian EU Presidencies in a Comparative Perspective (Eu-
ropean Union Studies Library, 1) (pp. 145-162), Dordrecht, Republic
of Letters.
Bučar, M. (2009), ERAWATCH COUNTRY REPORT 2009: Slovenia.
Analysis of Policy Mixes to Foster R&D Investment and to Contribute to the
ERA. Available at: http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction
=reports.content&topicID=600&parentID=592 (20th October 2009).
Bučar, M. and Stare, M. (2006), From Quantity to Quality: Critical
Assessment of Slovenia's Potential for Knowledge-Based Growth. In:
K. Piech and S. Radošević (Eds.), The Knowledge-Based Economy in
Central and Eastern Europe: Countries and Industries in a Process of Change
(pp. 239-255), Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
Bučar, M. and Rojec, M. (2009), Cases of Science-Industry Cooperation in








EC (2001), European Governance – White Paper; COM (2001) 428 Final.
EC (2003), Innovation Policy: Updating the Union's Approach in the Con-
text of the Lisbon Strategy, Communication from the Commission
COM (2003) 112, Brussels: EC.
EC (2007), Strategic Report on the Renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth
and Jobs: Launching the New Cycle (2008-2010). Keeping up the Pace of
Change, COM (2007(803)). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/growth
andjobs/pdf/european-dimension-200712-annual-progress-report/
200712-annual-report_en.pdf.
EC (2009), The Governance Challenge for Knowledge Policies in Lisbon
Strategy: Between Revolution and Illusion; Synthesis Report of Expert
Group for the Follow-Up of the Research Aspects of the Revised
Lisbon Strategy; European Commission DG Research.
EC (2010), European Innovation Scoreboard 2009 Comparative Analysis of
Innovation Performance, INNOMetrics. Available at: http://www.proinno-
-europe.eu/page/european-innovation-scoreboard-2009.
EIU – Economist Intelligence Unit (2009), A New Ranking of the World's
Most Innovative Countries; An EIU Report, April 2009, sponsored by
Cisco. Available at: http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Cisco_Innovation_
Complete.pdf.
EU (2004), Report from the High Level Group Chaired by Wim Kok
(Kok Report) (2004) Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth
and Employment. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/
kok_report_en.pdf.
EU (2006), PRO INNO Innovation Trend Chart on Innovation: Country
Report on Slovenia 2005.
EU (2009), PRO INNO Innovation Trend Chart on Innovation: Country
Report on Slovenia 2008. Available at: http://www.proinno-europe.eu/
trendchart/annual-country-reports.
EU (2010), PRO INNO Innovation Trend Chart on Innovation: Country
Report on Slovenia 2009. Available at: http://www.proinno-europe.eu/
trendchart/annual-country-reports.
Eurofound (2004), The Puzzle of Knowledge Society. Paper presented at
the Irish Presidency Conference "Foresight for Innovations – Thin-
king and Debating the Future: Shaping and Aligning Policies",
Dublin, 14-15 June 2004. Available at: http://www.eurofound.eu.int/
areas/industrialchange/knowledgesociety.htm.
European Council (2000), Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclu-
sions, March 2000. Available at: http://www.aedh.eu/plugins/ fckeditor/
userfiles/file/DESC/2000%20LISBON%20EUROPEAN%20COUNCIL%
2023%20AND%2024%20MARCH.pdf.
Eurostat (2010), Data available on the webpage of the EUROSTAT.
Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/euro
stat/home.
Eurostat (2011), Data available on the webpage of the EUROSTAT.
Available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/print.do?print=
true.
Felt, U. and Wynne, B. (Eds.) (2007), Taking European Knowledge Society







Science, Economy and Society Directorate, Directorate-General for Re-
search, European Commission. Luxembourg: Office for Official Pu-
blications of the European Communities, http://ec.europa.eu/research/
science-society/document_library/pdf_06/european-knowledge-
society_en.pdf.
Freeman, C. (1989), New Technology and Catching Up. The European
Journal of Development Research, 1 (1): 85-99. doi:10.1080/0957881890
8426503
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (1994), Endogenous Innovation
in Theory of Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8 (1): 23-44. doi:
10.1257/jep.8.1.23
IMAD (2005), Slovenian Development Strategy. Ljubljana, IMAD.
Available at: http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction
=policy.documentAjax&uuid=7D87A4CA-C30B-7F76-24B2D3F6E
1735FDE (20th October 2009).
IMAD (2010),Development Report 2010. Available at: http://www.umar.
gov.si/en/publications/?no_cache=1.




KEI (2007), Knowledge Economy Indicators. Workpackage 1: State-of-the-
Art on the Knowledge-Based Economy, http://kei.publicstatistics.net/.
KEI (2008), Workpackage 8: An Overview of the KEI Achievements; CIS
8{CT{2004{502529 KEI, http://kei.publicstatistics.net/.
Kooiman, J. (2003), Governing as Governance, London, Sage Publica-
tions, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi.
Lundvall, B.-Å. (Ed.) (1992), National Systems of Innovation: Towards a
Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, London, Pinter Publishers.
MHEST (2010), Osnutek Nacionalnega programa visokega šolstva (Draft
Programme on Higher Education). Available at: http://www.mvzt.gov.si/
si/zakonodaja_in_dokumenti/nacionalna_programa_v_pripravi/
javna_razprava_o_osnutku_npvs_2011_2020/
Mrak, M. (2010), The Post-Lisbon-Type Strategy – Perspectives and
Challenges. In: V. Samardžija and H. Butković (Eds.), From the Lisbon
Strategy to Europe 2020 (pp. 66-80), IMO, Zagreb.
Mulej M., Hyaeverinen, L., Jurše, K., Rafolt, B., Rebernik, M., Sdev-
čič, M. and Uršič, D. (1994), Inovacijski management, Maribor, Ekonom-
sko-poslovna fakulteta.
Nelson, R. R. (1993),National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analy-
sis, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S. G. (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of
Economic Change, Cambridge Mass. and London, England, Harvard
University Press.
NRDP (2006),National Research and Development Programme. Available
at: http://www.uradni-list.si/1/content?id=67936 (20th October 2009).









OECD (2005), Governance of Innovation Systems, Vol. 1: Synthesis Re-
port, Paris, OECD.
Official Gazette of the Rep. of Slovenia, 2010, No. 43/2010, from 31. 5. 2010.
Available at: http://www.uradni-list.si/1/index?edition=201043
Operativni program krepitve regionalnih razvojnih potencialov 2007–2013.
(Operational Programme for Strengthening Regional Development Potentials
2007–2013. Available at: http://www.svlr.gov.si/fileadmin/svlsrp.gov.si/
pageuploads/KOHEZIJA/OP_RR_USKLA-JENO_08_06_07_poslano.pdf.
Republic of Slovenia (2005), National Reform Programme for Achieving
the Lisbon Strategy Goals. Available at: http://www.umar.gov.si/fileadmin/
user_upload/projects/04_alizb-strategija.pdf.
Republic of Slovenia (2007),National Development Programme 2007-2013.
Ljubljana, Office of Government for Local Self Government and
Regional Policy.
Republic of Slovenia, Office for Growth (2008), National Reform Pro-
gramme for Achieving the Lisbon Strategy Goals – Implementation Report.
Available at: http://www.svr.gov.si/fileadmin/srs.gov.si/pageuploads/
Dokumenti/SI-NRP2008-en.pdf.
Romer, P. M. (1990), Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 98 (5): 71-102. doi:10.1086/261725
SORS (2009), Research and Development Activity, Slovenia, 2008 – Final
Data. Available at: http://www.stat.si/eng/novica_prikazi.aspx?id=2742.
SORS (2010a), Research and Development Activity, Slovenia, 2009 – Pre-
liminary Data. Data available on the webpage of the Statistical Office
of the Republic of Slovenia. Available at: http://www.stat.si/eng/index.asp.
SORS (2010b), Innovation Activity in Manufacturing and Selected Ser-
vices, Slovenia 2006-2008 – Final Data. Available at: http://www.stat.si/
eng/novica_prikazi.aspx?id=3447
SORS (2011a),Database on Innovation. Available at: http://www.stat.si/eng/
tema_ekonomsko_raziskovanje.asp.
SORS (2011b),Database on Education. Available at: http://www.stat.si/eng/
tema_demografsko_izobrazevanje.asp.
SORS (various years), Data available on the webpage of the Statisti-
cal Office of the Republic of Slovenia. Available at: http://www.stat.si/
eng/index.asp.
Stare, M. and Bučar, M. (2009), Driving Forces of Innovations to-
wards Services – Inclusive Innovation Policy in the New Member
States. Socialiniai mokslai, 1 (63): 7-14.
Stehr, N. (2003), The Social and Political Control of Knowledge in Mo-
dern Societies. International Social Science Journal, 55 (178): 643-655.
doi:10.1111/j.0020-8701.2003.05504014.x
Švarc, J. (2006), Institucionalne pretpostavke tranzicije u gospodar-
stvo znanja: karika koja nedostaje.Društvena istraživanja, 15 (3): 319-344.
Tilford, S. and Whyte, P. (2010), The Lisbon Scorecard X: the Road to
2020. Centre for European Reform, http://cer.org.uk/pdf/rp_967.pdf.
Udovič, B. and Bučar, M. (2008), Building the Knowledge Society:
The Case of European Union New Member States. Revija za sociolo-











Je li društvo znanja vizija ili iluzija?
Slučaj Slovenije
Maja BUČAR
Fakultet društvenih znanosti, Ljubljana
Slovenija je prelazak na gospodarstvo/društvo znanja
postavila u središte svoje strategije razvoja, kojom upravljaju
globalna ekonomska kretanja i koja je nadahnuta
Lisabonskom strategijom EU-a. Uspostava i dobro
funkcioniranje nacionalnoga inovacijskog sustava (NIS)
percipira se kao glavni instrument slovenske tranzicije u
društvo znanja. U članku se analiziraju neki od čimbenika
NIS-a i njihov recentni razvoj u cilju prikazivanja glavnih
nedostataka i dostignuća. Provedba glavnih strateških
dokumenata usmjerenih prema društvu znanja u zadnjih pet
godina daje neujednačenu sliku: na nekim područjima ciljevi
su ostvareni, dok na drugima ostaju rupe. U članku se
upozorava na problem sposobnosti upravljanja koji se često
zaboravlja, a bitan je čimbenik tranzicije. Bez poboljšanja
sposobnosti upravljanja, zemlja ne može uspostaviti učinkovit
NIS i prijeći u društvo znanja. To upućuje na činjenicu da
pretvaranje vizije u stvarnost zahtijeva osjetan napor u
poboljšanju sposobnosti upravljanja.
Ključne riječi: društvo/gospodarstvo znanja, nacionalni
inovacijski sustav, sposobnost upravljanja, Slovenija
Die Wissensgesellschaft: Vision oder
Illusion? Der Fall Slowenien
Maja BUČAR
Fakultät für Gesellschaftswissenschaften, Ljubljana
Slowenien hat den Übergang zur Wissenswirtschaft/
-gesellschaft in den Mittelpunkt ihrer Entwicklungsstrategie
gestellt, die einerseits von globalen Vorgängen im
Wirtschaftsbereich abhängig ist und sich andererseits an der
Lissabon-Strategie der EU orientiert. Einführung und gutes
Funktionieren eines nationalen Innovationssystems werden
dabei als die wichtigsten Instrumente der Überleitung
Sloweniens zu einer Wissensgesellschaft angesehen. Im
vorliegenden Artikel werden bestimmte Faktoren des







Entwicklung analysiert, um die bedeutendsten Ergebnisse,
aber auch um Mängel aufzuzeigen. Die in den letzten fünf
Jahren erfolgte Umsetzung der wichtigsten, auf den Ausbau
der Wissensgesellschaft ausgerichteten Strategiedokumente
zeigt einen ungleichmäßigen Verlauf: In bestimmten Be-
reichen konnten die Ziele erreicht werden, während
anderswo noch viele Leerstellen sind. Die Verfasserin verweist
auf das oftmals vernachlässigte Problem eines fähigen
Managements, das einen wesentlichen Faktor des Über-
gangs zur genannten neuen Gesellschaftsform darstellt.
Ohne verbessertes Management kann kein nationales
Innovationssystem erstellt werden und kann das Land sich
nicht zu einer Wissensgesellschaft entwickeln. Daraus ergibt
sich zwingend die Erkenntnis, dass die Umsetzung einer
Vision in Realität große Anstrengungen erfordert, zumal im
Hinblick auf ein verbessertes Management.
Schlüsselbegriffe: Wissensgesellschaft/-wirtschaft, nationales
Innovationssystem, kompetentes Management, Slowenien
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